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INTRODUCTION
he Fall 2007 contract negotiations between the United Autoworkers (UAW) and the Big Three automakers (General Motors, Chrysler LLC, and Ford Motor) were viewed as truly historic in significance as both respective parties struggled to attain their goals and reach mutually agreed upon labor contracts (Lucas and Furdek, 2009 ). Both the UAW and the Big Three automakers realized that in order to survive and compete successfully in the global economy, a new paradigm would be established. The primary goal for the UAW was to protect labor, while the goal for the Big Three automakers was to be competitive as well as profitable.
Following pattern bargaining, the UAW reached agreements with General Motors, followed by Chrysler LLC, and concluded with the Ford Motor Company. Each labor contract contained unprecedented provisions for both parties, permitting them to achieve their stated goals. The Big Three automakers were able to reduce their labor and benefit costs to close the gap with its rival automakers. On the other hand, the UAW gained work commitments at certain assembly facilities that protected current and future jobs for its membership.
In the GM-UAW labor agreement, a multi-dollar health-care trust fund, known as the Voluntary Employee Benefit Association (VEBA), was created to manage the health costs of retirees. GM estimated that this transfer of retirees' health care to the union-operated trust fund would result in a savings of $1,200 to $1,500 per car, compared to a car manufactured by its rival, Toyota Motor Corporation (Stoll and McCracken, 2009). Additionally, there were no pay raises allocated over the four-year agreement, but rather, lump sum payments of 3%, 4%, and 3% in the last three years of the contract (Lucas and Furdek, 2009 ). This labor contract also created a two-tier wage structure to provide a lower wage for newly hired workers in certain noncore jobs, as well as a 401(k) defined contribution plan (Lucas and Furdek, 2009). Another significant provision of the 456-page labor agreement was job security, as GM committed to build current and future products at sixteen of its eighteen U.S. assembly plants ( Lucas and Furdek, 2009 ).
Similar to the GM agreement, a multi-dollar VEBA was also established to cover the cost of health care for retirees in the UAW-Chrysler labor contract. Likewise, a two-tier wage and reduced benefit system was also created for its new hires performing noncore jobs. A job security provision designated a commitment from Chrysler to provide work for UAW workers for at least fifty of its fifty-nine facilities (Lucas and Furdek, 2009).
In the UAW-Ford Motor Company labor agreement, a VEBA was also established to address the health care costs of UAW retirees. However, the Ford Motor Company would contribute less to the retiree health trust fund, as compared to GM and Chrysler, because Ford was viewed, at the time, as the weakest financially of the three car manufacturing companies. The labor contract also provided for a lower wage and reduced benefit package for all new hires performing not only noncore jobs, but also assembly line work. A job security provision was also included to address a commitment from Ford Motor to have two assembly plants remain open (Lucas and Furdek, 2009).
In retrospect, all three labor agreements appeared to accomplish the goals sought by both parties that management was to be competitive and profitable and labor was to be protected. At the time, both the UAW and Big Three automakers were to be commended for their efforts to agree upon such innovative and groundbreaking labor contracts in order for the American auto industry to remain viable and successfully compete. However, there was a dramatic economic downturn experienced in the last quarter in 2007 and the financial crisis would dramatically impact the auto industry. As plunging auto sales continued, the Chief Executives of the Big Three automakers appealed to Congress for a financial bailout using taxpayer's monies to enable the auto industry to survive. After arduous and tumultuous debates in Congress, the White House agreed to $17.4 billion in bailout loans to both GM and Chrysler LLC on December 19, 2008 . GM received $13.4 billion in U.S. loans, while Chrysler accepted $4 billion (Stoll, Terlap, and Kellogg, 2009). The Ford Motor Company did not seek a bailout for it believed that it could sustain itself without governmental intervention.
As American gross domestic product shrank sharply to 6.1% in the first quarter of 2009, the worst performance of the U.S. economy in over fifty years, The Big Three automakers experienced severe financial losses. Auto sales continued to crumble, reflecting the severity of the recession. GM reported a $6 billion loss for the first quarter and its market share dipped to 18.6% (Ingrassia, 2009) In retrospect, the UAW and the Big Three automakers had agreed to landmark labor contracts in the Fall 2007. Each labor agreement contained cost saving measures for the automakers, as well as job security provisions for the UAW. At the time, the labor agreements appeared to achieve the desired goals for both parties. The automakers were to remain viable and competitive, while the UAW protected jobs for its membership. Since the passage of these labor contracts, auto sales have plunged to record lows as consumers are simply not purchasing new vehicles due to the severity of the recession experienced in the United States. Obviously, both the UAW and the Big Three Automakers could not have envisioned the severity of the recession when they negotiated these labor agreements. The question remains, could these labor agreements function during this economic downturn, and if not, what must the UAW and the Big Three automakers do in order to survive and compete in the auto industry. One major cost-cutting modification to the 2007 labor agreement pertained to the method that Ford funded the VEBA which affected approximately 187,000 retirees and spouses. The funding change was that fifty percent of future cash contributions to the retiree health care fund were replaced with company stock ). For Ford Motor, the total health-care liability was $13.6 billion over ten years; however, the company anticipated reducing its cash obligation to 6.6 billion with this new funding (Dolan and Stoll, 2009).
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
Another major cost-saving measure was to lower the total pay compensation per hour of a worker. Under the new contractual terms, the company lowered the total pay compensation per worker from $60 to $55 an hour including benefits, pensions, and bonuses. Thus, Ford Motor moved closer to the estimated $48 an hour compensation per worker that Toyota Corporation and other foreign automakers paid workers at their U.S. plants ). Other major concessions included cutbacks in work rules and reduced unemployment benefits for laid-off workers. All of these concessions were approved by the UAW membership with forty-nine percent of Ford's production workers and fifty-eight percent of the skill trade workers. These approval percentages were considerably lowered than the original 2007 agreement approval percentages of eighty-one percent for the production workers and seventy-one percent for the skill workers (Dolan, 2009 ). Under the prescribed conditions for the federal bailout loans, Chrysler LLC agreed to renegotiate VEBA and other labor cost-cutting measures with the UAW. It was estimated that Chrysler LLC had committed to a $10 billion contribution to VEBA; however, there was to be a contribution of both cash and stock under the terms of the bailout (Dolan, 2009 ). These modifications to the 2007 labor pact were to reduce the company's overall costs in order to avoid bankruptcy. 
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CONCLUSION
The 2007 labor agreements between the UAW and the Big Three automakers were designed to "usher in a new era for the industry." These labor contracts were negotiated and driven by the principle that the automakers would remain viable and competitive in the global economy while the UAW protected jobs for its membership. The creation and establishment of VEBA as well as a two-tier wage and benefit structure for newly hired workers were the cornerstone provisions of these labor pacts.
Since the ratification of these labor agreements, auto sales and market shares have plunged to record lows for the Big Three automakers due to the severity of the global recession. Both GM and Chrysler LLC received bailout loans to an estimated $62 billion; however, both companies filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. When a "new GM" emerges from bankruptcy, it will be 60% owned by the U.S. government, and the union health care trust fund will own 17.5%. The company plans to close seventeen plants and eliminate twenty thousand jobs by 2011 (King Jr., and Terlep, 2009) . A reorganized Chrysler LLC has completed its alliance with Fiat Spa with the U.S government owning 8% of the revamped company, and the UAW retiree health-care fund possessing a 55% stake (Bennett and Kellogg, 2009 ). Ford Motor has received no bailout loans from the federal government, but has requested a $25 billion loan from the U.S. Department of Energy to meet future fuel-efficiency standard. Additionally, Ford Motor received $695 million in loan guarantees for Volvo, to be used as part of the europroject to reduce emission and energy efficiency in cars ).
The Big Three automakers received concessionary agreements from the UAW in order to reduce the socalled "legacy costs" of the labor and benefits paid to union members established over the years. With GM and Chrysler LLC in bankruptcy, the fate VEBA and pension obligations for the retirees will be determined by a court decree. It was estimated that GM will spend $300 in retiree health care costs per vehicle and its pension fund, covering 500,000 retirees, was underfunded by $12 to $13 billion (Helliker, King Jr., and Stoll, 2009). It is fully anticipated that GM and Chrysler LLC will emerge from bankruptcy with a leaner workforce and fewer auto dealerships. The question still remains can the Big Three automakers still afford the wages and benefits it promised to the UAW under the modified labor agreements. Only time will reveal the effectiveness of these concessionary agreements; however, the UAW will be limited in reacting to any broken promises by the automakers since it agreed not to strike through 2015 under these revised labor agreements.
